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THE FELONY MURDER RULE-
A RE-EXAMINATION
The origin of the felony murder rule is said 'to be that at com-
mon law all felonies were punishable by death. Therefore it was
of no consequence whether the accused was hanged for the initial
felony or for the death resulting from actions connected with its
commission.' Because of the harshness of this rule the courts have
generally tended to restrict its application.2
However, a recent California case, through a liberal construc-
tion, has broadened the felony murder rule's application. In People
v. Washington3 the defendant and his co-felons, one of whom was
armed, entered a service station to commit a robbery. The owner
of the station, in an attempt to prevent the robbery, pulled out his
gun and began shooting. The defendant was shot and his armed co-
felon was killed. The defendant was tried and convicted for the
murder of his co-felon under the felony murder rule, Section 189
of the California Penal Code.' The court held that the tort concept
of proximate cause will support a conviction for murder when a
co-felon is killed by the intended victim.
The purpose of this paper will be to examine the felony murder
rule as applied in California and other jurisdictions, with particular
reference to California, and to the question of whether a felon should
be convicted for murder when the killing results from the act of
someone other than the defendant or his co-conspirators.
With reference to the question of whether a felon should be
guilty of murder when a co-felon or innocent third person has been
killed by the intended victim or some other third person, the courts
have generally taken two separate and distinct paths. Some courts
reason .that the felon is only responsible for killings committed by
the felon or the co-felons in the furtherance of the felony.' This is
the so-called agency rule. Others have held that the felon is responsi-
1 Hitchler, The Killer and His Intended Victim in Felony-Murder Cases, 53
DIcx. L. REv. 3, 5 (1948).
2 Note, A Survey of Felony Murder, 28 TEmp. L.Q. 453 (1954-55).
3 230 A.C.A. 351, 40 Cal. Rptr. 791 (1964).
4 CAL. PEN. CODE § 189 states:
All murder which is perpetrated by means of poison, . . . or which
is committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate arson, rape,
robbery, burglary, mayhem . . . is murder in the first degree; and all other
kinds of murders are of the second degree.
5 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958); People
v. Austin, 370 Mich. 12, 120 N.W.2d 766 (1963).
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ble for any killings that result as a natural and probable consequence
of the felony, the proximate cause rule.'
CALIFORNIA DECISIONS
Where, during the commission of a felony, one of the perpetra-
tors kills a third person, California courts have generally held a co-
felon equally guilty of murder.' The more interesting question in
the applications of the rule arises where the felony results in either
an accidental death involving two third persons, or the death of one
of the perpetrators. Apparently, only four California cases have
considered either of these situations.
The first of these, People v. Ferlin, involved a conspiracy to
commit arson. The defendant had hired a young man to help him
burn down the insured's property. The accomplice burned to death
as a result of the fire. The court affirmed an order for a new trial,
following a reversal of a conviction for murder (on the basis of the
felony murder rule) holding that the death was not in the further-
ance of the conspiracy, but was opposed to it.9
The next case, People v. Cabaltero,° involved an attempted
robbery by Cabaltero and six co-felons. During the commission of
the robbery one of the felons fired two shots to scare some ap-
proaching people. One of his accomplices became so enraged at this
that he shot and killed the felon who had fired the shots. All six
co-felons were tried for murder under the felony murder rule and
were convicted. On appeal the decision was affirmed. The court
distinguished Ferlin, and held that the doctrine that a conspirator
is not guilty when one of the conspirators goes beyond the original
design did not apply where the killing occurs during the perpetration
of a robbery."
In People v. Harrison,2 one of the victims inadvertently shot
6 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Thomas, 382 Pa. 639, 117 A.2d 204 (1955).
7 See, e.g., People v. Modesto, 59 Cal. 2d 722, 382 P.2d 33, 31 Cal. Rptr. 225
(1963); People v. Kemp, 55 Cal. 2d 458, 359 P.2d 913, 11 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1961);
People v. Whitehorn, 60 Cal. 2d 256, 383 P.2d 783, 32 Cal. Rptr. 199 (1963) ; People
v. Mason, 54 Cal. 2d 164, 351 P.2d 1025, 4 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1960); People v. Chavez,
37 Cal. 2d 656, 234 P.2d 632 (1951) ; People v. Boss, 210 Cal. 245, 290 Pac. 881 (1930).
s 203 Cal. 587, 265 Pac. 230 (1928).
9 Id. at 597, 265 Pac. at 235.
10 31 Cal. App. 2d 52, 87 P.2d 364 (1939).
11 Id. at 60, 87 P.2d at 368. Professor Morris in an article, The Felon's Respon-
sibility for the Lethal Acts of Others, 105 U. PA. L. RaV. 50, 73 (1956), attacks this
reasoning. Thus, if two burglars are robbing a house and one happens to glance out
a window, see an old enemy he wants to kill, and kills him, then the other burglar
would also be guilty of 1st degree murder.
12 176 Cal. App. 2d 330, 1 Cal. Rptr. 414 (1959).
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and killed the other victim while attempting to prevent the felony.
In affirming the conviction of murder the court held that the tort
concept of proximate cause applied and that the killing was a natural
and probable result of the defendant's acts.
Finally, there is the instant Washington case which has held
that the defendant is guilty of murder when his co-felon is killed
by the victim.
These cases suggest that there is no clear application of the
felony murder rule in California. However, in light of the recent
Harrison and Washington decisions there seems to be a trend ex-
tending the felony murder rule through the concept of proximate
cause.
OTHER DECISIONS
A series of Pennsylvania cases gradually extended the applica-
tion of proximate cause to the felony murder rule. In the first of
these, Commonwealth v. Thompson,"3 the defendant killed one of
his victims during a gun battle. In upholding the conviction, the
court said the jury must have been satisfied "beyond a reasonable
doubt" that it was the defendant's bullet that had caused the death.'
In Commonwealth v. Moyer'5 the defendant had used the
deceased as a shield. The court stated that it was immaterial
whether the defendant or one of the intended victims fired the
fatal shot. The court expanded saying:
Every robber or burglar knows that a likely later act in the chain
of events he inaugurates will be the use of deadly force against him
on the part of the selected victim. For whatever results follow from
the natural and legal use of retaliating force the felon must be held
responsible. 16
Thus the elements of proximate cause (foreseeability and natural
and probable consequences) began to enter into the reasoning.
The next case, Commonwealth v. Almeida," involved the kill-
ing of an off duty policeman who was attempting to prevent a rob-
bery. The court once again held that it was immaterial who fired
the fatal shot, and it also suggested that the tort and criminal con-
cepts of proximate cause were one and the same.' The lower court
13 321 Pa. 327, 184 Atl. 97 (1936).
14 Id., 184 At. at 99.
15 357 Pa. 181, 53 A.2d 736 (1947).
16 Id., 53 A.2d at 742.
17 362 Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595 (1949).
18 Id., 68 A.2d at 601-02. But see, Morris, The Felon's Responsibility for the
Lethal Acts of Others, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 50, 52 & n.10 (1956). The footnote cites
two other writers who are also in disagreement.
[Vol. 5
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had refused to give instructions on proximate cause, holding this to
be a matter of law. This led to a dissent on the appeal by Justice
Jones in which he stated:
Whether the acts of Almeida and his confederates were sufficient
to constitute the proximate cause of the killing was a question of law
but whether they did constitute the proximate cause was a question
of fact for the jury.19
The reasoning in Almeida was soon extended to the situation
where the co-felon, and not a third party, is killed. People v. Bolish,2 °
reached this result, with facts quite similar to the California case
of People v. Ferlin. In Bolish one of the felons was killed as the re-
sult of an explosion which occurred during the commissiin of the
crime. The Pennsylvania court, using the doctrine of proximate
cause, found the defendant guilty of the murder of his co-felon.
Justice Bell offered this explanation of the felony murder rule:
Malice express or implied is the criterion and absolutely essen-
tial ingredient of murder. Malice in its legal sense exists not only when
there is a wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart, wanton conduct,
cruelty, recklessness of consequence and a mind regardless of social
duty .... If there was an unlawful killing with (legal) malice, express
or implied, that will constitute murder even though there was no
intent to injure or kill the particular person who was killed and even
though the death was unintentional or accidental. 21
A law review article22 criticized this reasoning:
In other words "malice" the mens rea of murder is identical with
the mens tea of larceny-which is absurd. . . . It is the typical
semantic error; it is assumed that to each word there is one referent.23
Even more controversial was the decision in Commonwealth v.
Thomas.24 In that case the defendant and his accomplice robbed a
store and after the robbery took different escape routes. During an
ensuing pursuit the accomplice was killed by the robbery victim. The
defendant was captured, tried and convicted for the murder of his
co-felon. The conviction was affirmed by a vote of 4 to 3, with two
dissenting opinions and one concurring opinion. One of the dissenters
was of the view that the felon who was killed forfeited any right
to be protected by the law by engaging in the felony and that there-
fore the defendant should not be guilty of murder. 5 He also stated
19 362 Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595, 618 (1949).
20 381 Pa. 500, 113 A.2d 464 (1955).
21 Id., 113 A.2d at 470.
22 Morris, The Felon's Responsibility for the Lethal Acts of Others, 105 U. PA.
L. REv. 50 (1956).
23 Id. at 61.
24 382 Pa. 639, 117 A.2d 204 (1955).
25 Id., 117 A.2d at 221. Query as to whether a law breaker loses his right to
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that "The thing which is imputed to a felon for a killing incidental
to his felony is malice and not the act of the killing." 6 He further
stated that in his opinion the act must have been committed in
furtherance of the felonious undertaking to support a charge of
murder." The majority opinion held that proximate cause was a
good rule for the law of crimes because ". . . (S)uch a rule is
equally consistent with reason and sound public policy, and is essen-
tial to the protection of human life." 8
Justice Bell, in a concurring opinion, enunciated the rule as
follows:
The reason is that (a) any person committing any common law
felony or one of the enumerated statutory felonies, possesses a
malevolent state of mind which the law calls "malice"; and (b) malice
is present in the felon (or felons) actually or by legal implication not
only at the time of the original felony but also at the time of the
killing; and (c) such person is from time immemorial responsible for
the natural and reasonably foreseeable results of his felony.2 9
The decision elicited much comment from the writers"° and
one author specifically took exception with ,the concurring opinion.81
He states that the malice requisite for a felony is different from that
required for murder, and that for certain killings the intent to kill
is allowed to be presumed from the intent to commit the felony. Thus
the necessary malice is implied rather than express. The distinction
is important, since it allows the felony murder rule to remain as a
mens rea device and does not permit the court to impute the killing
to the felon. What is imputed, however, is the implied intent to kill.
Causation must still be proved. As for Justice Bell's third point, this
commentator states it had never been true except for the cases
where the defendant deliberately exposed another to the threat of
death by using him as a human shield and in cases where death
resulted from an attempt to escape the danger caused by the de-
fendant.
Another article maintained that the Pennsylvania courts were
the protection of the law. Does this mean that at some later time an individual may
murder a felon and be set free because the law considers the felon's life already
forfeited ?
26 382 Pa. 639, 117 A.2d 204, 215 (1955).
27 Ibid.
28 Id., 117 A.2d at 205.
29 Id., 117 A.2d at 207.
30 See, e.g., 44 GEO. L.J. 529 (1956), 54 Micin. L. REv. 860 (1956), 31 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 1125 (1956), 30 So. CAL. L. REV. 357 (1957), 29 TEMP. L.Q. 205 (1956), and
9 VA-D. L. REv. 877 (1956). There were at least 26 law review articles written on
the case.
31 Morris, supra note 22, at 60-61.
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holding ,that any possible killing in any possible way by any possible
person was a probable death which was foreseeable."2
Professor Morris states that these cases have resulted in a
double application of the felony murder rule. First, the rule is used
to hold that the death is foreseeable and therefore is murder. Second,
under the statute, the homicide is murder in the first degree. Thus
the rule is used to impute the killing and also to impute the malice
requirement of first degree murder.3
In 1958, the case of Commonwealth v. Redline34 came before
the court. In this case Redline started a gun battle with police officers
in which his accomplice was killed. In reversing a conviction of mur-
der the court expressly overruled Thomas as an unwarranted exten-
sion of the felony murder rule and limited Almeida to its particular
fact situation.35 For the purposes of distinguishing the two cases the
court recognized the difference between justifiable and excusable
homicide. 6 The court also rejected the proximate cause theory of
causation and applied what is sometimes called the agency theory.
The court said:
... [Ilt is to be remembered at all times that the thing which is
imputed to a felon for a killing incidental to his felony is malice and
not the act of killing. The mere coincidence of homicide and felony
is not enough to satisfy the requirements of the felony-murder doctrine.
"It is necessary . . . to show that the conduct causing death was done
in furtherance of the design to commit the felony ... and not merely
coincidence. .. 37
Thus Pennsylvania abandoned its attempt to follow a proxi-
mate cause theory where a felon is charged with the murder of his
accomplice. A later Pennsylvania case, Commonwealth v. Root,3 8 has
finally rejected the theory of proximate cause in all homicides. The
court in that case held that proximate cause has no proper place in
criminal homicide prosecutions. A more direct causal connection is
required.39
The so-called agency theory, as employed by Redline is best
exemplified by a New York decision:
It is the malice of the underlying felony that is attributed to the
felon .... Thus, a felony murder embraces not any killing incidentally
82 Ludwig, Foreseeable Death in Felony Murder, 18 U. PiTT. L. REv. 51, 59
(1956-57).
33 Morris, supra note 22, at 64-65.
34 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958).
35 Id., 137 A.2d at 482.
36 Id., 137 A.2d at 483.
37 Id., 137 A.2d at 476.
8 403 Pa. 571, 170 A.2d 310 (1961).
39 Id., 170 A.2d at 314.
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coincident with the felony . . . but only those committed by one of
the criminals in the attempted execution of the unlawful end. Although
the homicide itself need not be within the common design . . . the
act which results in death must be in furtherance of the unlawful
purpose .... 40
The essential difference between the proximate cause rule and
the agency rule thus appears in cases where the act of killing is not
that of the defendant. Under the proximate cause theory a de-
fendant would be responsible when an innocent person is killed,41
but he would not be responsible under the agency rule.42 If the
co-felon is killed by a third party the defendant will be held respon-
sible under the proximate cause theory,4 but not under the agency
rule.44 And where the co-felon accidentally kills himself under the
proximate cause theory the defendant would again be held respon-
sible45 while under the agency theory he would not be held.4 6
CONCLUSION
The preceding analysis points out the distinction between the
agency and proximate cause theories. Under either theory the de-
fendant can be held liable even though the act is that of his accom-
plice. With these alternatives, there are strong arguments that the
felony murder rule should be abolished.
Assuming that deterrence is one the fundamental bases of crim-
inal law, and that the felony murder rule is desired to prevent kill-
ings during the perpetration of a robbery, should not the penalty
for armed robbery be increased? Under the present law a killing dur-
ing the commission of a felony ordinarily results in a charge of
first degree murder. Clearly this result does not prevent robberies
or other felonies. At least one commentator agrees:
40 People v. Wood, 8 N.Y.2d 48, 51, 201 N.Y.S.2d 328, 331-332, 167 N.E.2d
736, 738. However the New York Statute (§ 1044 of the PENAL LAW, CONSOL. LAW
c. 40.) states: "The killing of a human being unless it is excusable or justifiable, is
murder in the first degree when committed:
"2. Without a design to effect death by a person engaged in the commission
of . . . a felony. . . ." The court said that it was obviously the intent of the legis-
lature that the only person charged be the one who did the killing."
41 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Almeida, supra note 17; People v. Harrison, supra
note 12.
42 See, e.g., People v. Wood, supra note 40.
43 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Redline, supra note 24.
44 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Redline, supra note 34; People v. Garripo, 292
Il. 293, 127 N.E. 75 (1920), where there was no evidence as to who had actually
killed the co-felon. The court ruled that in order for the co-felons to be guilty, it
would have to be proved that the killing was done in furtherance of the conspiracy.
45 See, e.g., People v. Bolish, supra note 20.
46 See, e.g., People v. Ferlin, supra note 8.
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As a general proposition it is submitted that the statutorily
authorized and judicially implemented application of substantially
heavier punishments on all felons carrying a gun at the time of their
felony (or taking part in a felony where a co-felon used a gun in
furtherance of the felony) would better serve the purpose of deter-
ring the type of conduct in Almeida and Thomas than.do the decisions
in those cases. Some jurisdictions have provided for such higher penal-
ties, but there would appear to be a reluctance on the part of the
courts to impose wholeheartedly these heavier penalties. In England
and other countries of the British Commonwealth, particularly where
the police are unarmed, such a policy is deliberately followed by the
courts. The general opinion in these countries is that there is wisdom
in this course. The essential harm is that the felon carries or uses a
gun-let us fasten upon that with the utmost severity. 47
This is not to say that the felon should go unpunished for a re-
sultant death, but if it is necessary for the protection of society that
the felon be punished then possibly the felon should be charged with
manslaughter. This would more accurately reflect the harm done and
do less violence to established doctrine.
Since the agency rule of felony murder appears to be the better
view, then the felony murder rule is merely an alternative theory on
which to try the defendant. 48 If the killing is required to be the
result of the defendant's act, then it would seem that the felon should
be charged with murder since he had the express intent to kill.
There is no need to imply the malice from the fact that he was en-
gaged in a felony. As far as the co-felons are concerned, if one felon
was guilty of murder then the others would also be guilty under the
normal rules applied to parties to a crime.
Accordingly, the California felony murder rule should be modi-
fied.49 It is submitted that the California Supreme Court should re-
verse the conviction in the Washington case and thus reverse the
trend in California law for two reasons.
First, California should follow the more logical agency rule es-
poused in Redline and hold that the killing, in order to come under
the felony murder rule, should have to be done in furtherance of the
felony. As was said in one law review note:
A closer causal connection between the felony and the killing
47 Morris, supra note 22, n.77.
48 See, e.g., People v. Chavez, 37 Cal. 2d 656, 234 P.2d 632 (1951), where the
court said that the jurors need not agree on which theory to base defendant's con-
viction. It is sufficient if each juror is convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
In Chavez there was enough evidence to convict without the felony murder rule.
49 Packer, The Model Code and Beyond, 63 COLUM. L. RV. 594, 598-599 (1963);
Prevezer, The English Homicide Act, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 624, 633-636 (1957) ; Morris,
The Felon's Responsibility for the Lethal Acts of Others, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 50
(1956); Moreland, Law of Homicide, pp. 50-53 (1952).
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than the proximate cause theory normally applicable to tort cases
should be required because of the extreme penalty attached to a
conviction for felony murder and the difference between the under-
lying rationales of criminal and tort law.50
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in the Redline case ad-
mitted that both the Almeida and Thomas decisions were judicial
extensions of the felony murder rule through the application of the
proximate cause concept. It is felt by the writer that the better view
is the agency rule of Redline under which a felon is not responsible
for the death of his co-felon when someone else kills him.
Secondly, the California statute defining felony murder is not
broad enough to include a case such as Washington. Penal Code sec-
tion 189 states:
All murder which is perpetrated by means of poison, . . . or
which is committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate arson,
rape, robbery, burglary, mayhem, . . . is murder of the first degree;
all other kinds are murders of the second degree.
All killing is not murder. If the legislature intended a person to
be guilty for all deaths, they would have inserted the word homicide
in the statute rather than murder. Therefore, a result such as ar-
rived at in the Washington case should logically proceed from a
statute which would cover all homicides.
Enlightened jurisdictions have met the problem with a logi-
cal compromise. Realizing the difficulty of a statute such as Cali-
fornia's which uses murder, yet realizing the harshness of the felony
murder rule they have included all killings in this statute but limited
the punishment.5 1 England, the birthplace of the felony murder
rule, has for all practical effect abolished it. In England in order
for a killing committed during a felony to constitute murder it must
be done with the same malice aforethought as would normally be
required for murder.52
50 71 HARV. L. REV. 1565, 1566 (1957-58).
51 WIs. STAT. § 940.03 calls it third degree murder and states: "Whoever in
the course of committing or attempting to commit a felony causes the death of
another human being as a natural and probable consequence of the commission of
or attempt to commit the felony, may be imprisoned not more than 15 years in
excess of the maximum penalty provided by law for the felony."
MINN. STAT. § 609.195(2) calls it third degree murder and provides for a 25 year
penalty. Minnesota, however, retains the felony murder rule for rape and sodomy
(§ 609.185).
52 5 & 6 EuLz. 2, C. 11, Part 1, 1 (1) which states, "Where a person kills another
in the course of furtherance of some other offense, the killing shall not amount to
murder unless done with the same malice aforethought (express or implied) as is
required for a killing to amount to murder when not done in the course of furtherance
of another offense."
Part 1, 1 (2) says that there is malice when resisting arrest.
[Vol. 5
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The court in Redline stated:
If predominant present-day thinking should deem it necessary
to the public's safety and security that felons be made chargeable
with murder for all deaths occurring in and about the perpetration
of their felonies-regardless of how or by whom such fatalities came-
the legislature should be looked to for competent exercise of the
State's sovereign police power to that end which has never yet been
legislatively ordained. 53
California's statute limits the felony murder rule to murder.
This requires a certain mens rea. Extension of the statute to those
killings not requiring this specific intent, is a legislative, not a judi-
cial function.
Aurelio Munoz
53 Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, -, 137 A.2d 472, 474 (1958).
